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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
SCOTT BOWMAN, : Case No. 960372-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered April 29, 1996. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
prosecutor's peremptory strikes of two of three minorities from 
the jury panel were not purposefully discriminatory where the 
prosecutor's justification for striking one juror was patently 
false, and his justification for striking the other juror was not 
supported by the record? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The determination of whether a 
prosecutor's strike is purposefully discriminatory generally 
turns on credibility, and will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. State v. Higcrinbotham, 917 P. 2d 545 (Utah 1996) . 
However, while the court often refers to the standard of review 
as "clearly erroneous," the issue of whether a prosecutor's 
justification is pretextual is treated as a mixed question of 
fact and law with proper deference given to the trial court's 
assessment of credibility. See generally State v.Cantu, 778 P.2d 
517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II."), State v. Hiqqinbotham, 917 P.2d 
545 (Utah 1996). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: After each party had 
exercised its peremptory challenges and prior to the jury being 
sworn, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. After a 
bench conference, the trial court swore in the jury and excused 
the remaining panelists. R. 3 66. Defense counsel, relying on 
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 
challenged the prosecutor's strikes against prospective jurors My 
Dang and Frances Alires. R. 367. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err by refusing to 
instruct the jury, at counsel's request, that Bowman's admission 
that he was the driver, which was admitted only for impeachment 
purposes because of concerns that it was given to the police in 
violation of Miranda, could not be used substantively? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue of whether a trial judge 
erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), State v. 
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: Defense counsel asked the 
trial court to instruct the jury that Bowman's admission to 
2 
police officers could be used only for impeachment purposes and 
not as substantive evidence. R. 251. 
ISSUE III: Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by 
arguing to the jury, in response to defense counsel's comment 
that the State had failed to call a material eye witness, that 
the defendant had subpoena power and should have called the 
missing State's witness himself? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The test of whether the remarks 
made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a 
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
PRESERVATION OP THE ISSUE: Immediately after the 
prosecutor commented on Bowman's failure to call the State's eye 
witness, Defense counsel objected. R. 281. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
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himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 
Rule 105, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one 
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to 
another party or for another purpose is admitted, 
the court, upon request, shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Scott Bowman ("Bowman"), was charged with 
Failure to Respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5, and Plate and 
Registration Violation, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5). R. 7. After a two-day jury 
trial, Bowman was convicted of both counts on January 18, 1996. 
R. 67-8. Presiding Judge William A. Thorne sentenced Bowman to 
serve a term of zero to five years on Count I, and three months 
on Count II, concurrent, and suspended both upon completion of 24 
4 
months probation. R. 94-95. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
On August 5, 1995, at around midnight, Deputy Ann Cardon 
("Cardon") with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office was stopped 
at the intersection of 2 0th East and 23rd South when she observed 
a motorcycle travelling eastbound run the red light. R. 140-41. 
Cardon activated her lights and pursued the driver. R. 144. She 
lost sight of the motorcycle when it turned into a nearby 
business. R. 145. Anticipating that the driver would probably 
try to come back onto 23rd East from a side street, Cardon went 
to the end of the street to head the driver off. R. 146. Cardon 
blocked the side street with her vehicle. She then saw the 
driver coming towards her down the side street. 147-48. The 
driver was able to maneuver the bike past the patrol car. 14 9. 
Cardon continued to pursue the motorcycle but lost sight of him. 
R. 151. 
As Cardon was driving through the area looking for the 
motorcycle, Kevin Mitchell ("Mitchell") approached her and said 
he had seen the chase. R. 152. Mitchell told Cardon that the 
driver was the Appellant, Bowman. R. 152-53, 172. Mitchell gave 
Cardon Bowman's name, address, phone number, and birth date. 
R. 153. Mitchell was a former roommate who Bowman had kicked out 
for dealing drugs. R. 221. Deputy Cardon went to the address 
given to her by Mitchell. In front of the apartment was a brown, 
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two-tone, Honda motorcycle. Deputy Lenny Bruno ("Bruno") of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's office also went to the apartment. 
R. 155. He observed the motorcycle and testified that the engine 
was hot. R. 192-94. Cardon identified Bowman as the driver of 
the motorcycle. R. 156. Bowman was arrested and transported to 
jail. R. 157. 
Bowman testified that he was not the driver and had not 
driven his motorcycle that night. R. 218-19. 
II. JURY SELECTION 
The prospective jurors were all given questionnaires to 
fill out prior to trial. R. 114. Copies of the questionnaires 
were distributed to counsel. R. 341. After the trial court had 
questioned the prospective jurors, the prosecutor was given an 
opportunity to also question the panel. R. 341. The prosecutor 
noted that some of the prospective jurors had indicated on their 
questionnaires that they had family or friends that had been 
charged with a criminal offense. He asked the panel if that 
experience would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. 
No one responded. R. 341. 
Each party used only three of their peremptory strikes 
because there were not enough people left on the panel to seat a 
jury after for cause strikes had been taken. R. 69-70. The 
prosecutor struck prospective juror My Dang ("Ms. Dang") first. 
He used his second strike against Frances Alires ("Mrs. Alires"). 
R. 69-70. The remaining minority member, Mr. Nadkarni, was 
struck by defense counsel because he had a contractual 
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relationship with law enforcement, and had earlier that week been 
struck for cause at defense counsel's request from a different 
panel in a prior trial. R. 369-70. (A complete summary of jury 
selection is included in Addendum I). 
After each party had taken its peremptory strikes, 
defense counsel challenged the prosecutor's strikes of Ms. Dang 
and Mrs. Alires. R. 367. Counsel noted that Ms. Dang was a 
person of Asian descent, and Mrs. Alires of Hispanic descent. No 
one questioned his observations. R. 367. Counsel pointed out 
that the prosecutor had not individually questioned either woman 
when given the opportunity. R. 3 67. The prosecutor responded by 
claiming that he struck Ms. Dang because when he heard her speak 
he did not think she had a good command of the English language. 
R. 368. The prosecutor justified striking Mrs. Alires on the 
grounds that he had prosecuted another individual with same last 
name and thought they may be related. R. 368. Defense counsel 
pointed out that on the questionnaire, Mrs. Alires had stated 
that she did not have any friends or family members who had been 
charged with a crime. R. 368-369. (A copy of Mrs. Alires' 
questionnaire is provided in Addendum II). 
The trial court denied defense counsel's challenge 
stating: 
I think the case law makes fairly clear that the 
challenge at least has to pose [a] race-neutral 
basis. It does not, if I remember part of the 
words of the Court, it doesn't have to be a good 
reason, it simply has to be a neutral reason. 
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I will note for the record as well that there is 
a person of obvious Indian descent who did remain 
and was not stricken. 
R. 369. (A copy of the transcript of the prosecutor's responses 
is included in Addendum III). 
III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR A LIMITING 
INSTRUCTION 
Bowman testified that he had not driven his motorcycle 
that night. R. 219. On cross examination, the prosecutor 
confronted Bowman with inconsistent remarks made to the police. 
Bowman stated he could not remember making many of the statements 
and denied making others. R. 227-29. The prosecutor recalled 
Deputy Bruno for rebuttal. Bruno testified that Bowman admitted 
he had run from the police because he was angry with his wife for 
refusing him visitation with his children. R. 235. Cross-
examination revealed that Bowman's statements may have been made 
in response to questions by the police, while in custody, and 
without Miranda warnings. Bruno also admitted that he had not 
provided a copy of his report, which contained Bowman's 
admissions, to the State or defense counsel until the day of 
trial. R. 237-40. Deputy Cardon also testified on rebuttal that 
Bowman had made similar statements to her while being transported 
to the jail. R. 24-45. 
Defense counsel informed the trial court that he had not 
received a copy of Bruno's report until that day. He moved to 
have Bowman's admissions stricken because they were taken in 
violation of Miranda. R. 249. The prosecutor responded that he 
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had used the statements in rebuttal for impeachment, and the 
statements were admissible for that purpose. R. 250. The trial 
court expressed concern that some of the statements may have been 
given in violation of Miranda. R. 250. Again, the prosecutor 
noted that he had waited to use the statements in rebuttal for 
impeachment. R. 250. At that point, defense counsel requested a 
limiting instruction telling the jury they could only use 
Bowman's statements for impeachment purposes. R. 251. The 
prosecutor stated for the third time that he only used the 
statements on rebuttal for impeachment, but claimed that if the 
statements came in for impeachment purposes, they could also be 
used substantively, even if taken in violation of Miranda. 
R. 251. 
The trial court, apparently wishing to avoid a mid-trial 
suppression hearing on whether Bowman's statements were taken in 
violation of Miranda, ruled that the statements were admissible 
"as presented." R. 252. The trial court was apparently 
referring to the prosecutor's assertion that he presented 
Bowman's statements only for impeachment purposes on rebuttal. 
R. 250-51. The trial court refused defense counsel's request for 
a limiting instruction. R. 252. The trial court stated that a 
limiting instruction would only draw the attention of the jurors 
to the statements. The court also stated that the instruction 
was not "critical" since the real question before the jury was 
Cardon's identification of the driver. R. 252. (A copy of the 
pertinent sections of the transcript is included in Addendum IV). 
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IV. THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER REMARKS DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
During closing argument defense counsel argued that the 
State had failed to meet its burden of proof because it did not 
call Mitchell, the man who told Deputy Cardon that Bowman was the 
driver, to testify. R. 272. Counsel questioned why the State 
would fail to call a material eye witness to the stand unless it 
was unsure of his credibility. R. 272-73. Counsel noted that 
according to Bowman, Mitchell had been very angry with him for 
throwing him out. R. 273. Counsel further argued that Cardon's 
identification was tainted by Mitchell's telling her that Bowman 
was the driver. R. 274. 
In response to defense counsel's attempts to show the 
jury the weaknesses of the State's case, the prosecutor stated: 
And so if Mr. Bowman--or [defense counsel] thinks 
he's such an important witness, although he has 
no responsibility to produce any evidence, he has 
every opportunity to bring him in and let you 
hear from him. So, if he wanted you to hear from 
him, he has that opportunity--
Defense counsel objected and was overruled at which point the 
prosecutor continued: 
Thank you, Judge. So, if--if that's such a big 
deal to [defense counsel], he has every 
opportunity to bring in everybody he wants, he 
has the subpoena power of the Court and so he 
wants you to think, boy, that's a big flaw in the 
State's case. 
R. 281-82. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor's use of two-thirds of his peremptory 
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strikes to remove two-thirds of the panelists belonging to racial 
minority groups violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution. The prosecutor's justification for 
removing a prospective Hispanic juror, Mrs. Alires, was a pretext 
for purposeful discrimination. His claim that he struck 
Mrs. Alires because her last name was the same as someone he had 
prosecuted does not merit belief because Mrs. Alires had 
indicated in her jury questionnaire that she had no family or 
friends who had been charged with a crime. The prosecutor had 
read the questionnaires, but never asked Mrs. Alires about her 
familial ties when given the opportunity. The prosecutor's 
justification for striking Ms. Dang, a woman of Asian descent, 
was also pretextual. His claim that Ms. Dang did not have a 
sufficient grasp of the English language was not supported by the 
record. 
The trial court erred by refusing to grant defense 
counsel's request for a limiting instruction directing the jury 
that they could use Bowman's admission that he had run because he 
was angry with his wife only for impeachment purposes. The 
trial court had agreed to allow the admissions, even though they 
may have been taken in violation of Miranda, because the State 
used them only for impeachment purposes on rebuttal. Wishing to 
avoid a mid-trial suppression hearing, the trial court allowed 
the admissions only for impeachment, but refused defense 
counsel's request for a limiting instruction. The State's case 
against Bowman hinged on the reliability of Cardon's 
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identification of the driver. The court's error was prejudicial 
because it allowed the jury to convict Bowman without having to 
evaluate the credibility of Deputy Cardon's identification. 
Lastly, the prosecutor committed misconduct when during 
closing argument he told the jury that Bowman had subpoena power 
and should have called Mitchell. Though Mitchell was the only 
other eye witness to the crime and knew Bowman, the State did not 
call him. When confronted with this fact, the State improperly 
argued that Bowman should have called the State's witness 
himself. The State's remark was improper because Mitchell was 
available to the State, and his testimony could not have been 
expected to be favorable to Bowman. The effect of the State's 
argument was to shift the burden of proof to Bowman, and to 
invite negative speculation as to why Bowman did not call the 
State's eye witness himself. The prosecutor's comment undermined 
Bowman's right to a fair trial because it shifted the jury's 
focus away from the critical issue in the case, the reliability 
of the State's eye witness identification, and implied that he 
had the burden of proving his innocence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR STRUCK TWO MINORITY 
JURORS FROM THE PANEL IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717, 476 U.S. 
79, 86 (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection 
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Clause forbids a prosecutor from using peremptory strikes to 
remove minority jurors because of their race. Batson was decided 
in response to prior cases in lower courts which required a 
defendant show proof of repeated striking of minorities over a 
number of cases to establish a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, Id. 1720-21, 92-93. Since this requirement placed a 
"crippling burden of proof" on the defendant, the Court 
recognized that prosecutors were able to use peremptory strikes 
in a discriminatory and unconstitutional manner without risk of 
judicial scrutiny of their actions. Jd. Batson sought to 
address this problem by allowing a defendant to make a prima 
facie showing of racial discrimination by relying solely on the 
facts surrounding jury selection in his case. Also, "the 
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can 
be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury 
selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of 
a mind to discriminate.'" Id. at 1722-23, 95-96. 
Discriminatory jury selection harms not only the 
defendant, but also harms the excluded juror and the community as 
a whole. Id. at 1718, 89. "Racial discrimination in the 
selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial 
process and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in 
doubt." The jury acts as a check against the enormous power 
prosecutors wield in the name of the State. When the process by 
which the jury is selected is tainted, confidence in the jury as 
a safeguard of the people is undermined. Since the very means by 
13 
which the jury was selected was unfair, public confidence in the 
verdict is eroded. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411-413, 113 L. 
Ed. 2d 411, 425-26, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a 
race-based peremptory challenge is a 
constitutional violation committed in open court 
at the outset of the proceedings. The overt 
wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, 
casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, 
the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the 
law throughout the trial of the cause. 
Id. at 413, 426. Because the juror who is excluded also has been 
wronged, but will seldom litigate, the criminal defendant has 
third party standing to raise the claim on his or her behalf. 
Id. at 415-16, 428. 
In order to establish a claim under Batson, the defendant 
must make a showing of purposeful discrimination. Batson set up 
an analysis that shifted the burden of proof from the defendant 
to the State upon a prima facie showing of discrimination. Most 
jurisdictions, including Utah, then required that the State's 
justification for the strike be (1) neutral, (2) related to the 
case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
legitimate. State v. Hiaainbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 
1996) . 
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed 
the principles behind Batson, but has clarified the burden the 
State must meet to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination. 
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995). 
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent 
of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination (step 1), the 
14 
burden of production shifts to the proponent of 
the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation (step 2) . If a race-neutral 
explanation is tendered, the trial court must 
then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the 
strike has proved purposeful discrimination. 
Id. at 1771. 
Now, under Purkett, any facially neutral explanation will 
serve to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination. Judicial 
review does not stop here, however. At step three, the court 
must determine whether the reason given by the State was a 
pretext for purposeful discrimination. The effect of Elem was 
not to preclude meaningful judicial review of the legitimacy of 
the justification for the strike. Elem merely focuses the 
court's review of the plausibility of the prosecutor's 
explanation at step 3, rather than step 2. At step 3, 
"implausible or fantastic justifications may and probably will be 
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." .Id. at 
1771. 
A. MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT 
To establish a Batson claim, the appellant must "marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding, and 
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack." Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. The 
State justified striking Mrs. Alires from the panel because he 
was prosecuting someone else by that name and thought 
Mrs. Alires might be related to that person. That person had 
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allegedly given stolen property to her relatives. R. 369-69. If 
Mrs. Alires were related to someone the prosecutor was currently 
charging, he would be understandably concerned about possible 
hostile feelings towards the State. If she were involved in 
suspected criminal conduct, the State would also have a 
legitimate reason to strike her from the panel. Also, the 
prosecutor claimed not to know if Alires was a member of a 
minority group. R. 3 68-69.x 
The State justified striking Ms. Dang on the grounds that 
after hearing her speak, she did not appear to have a good 
command of the English language. R. 368. Both the State and the 
trial judge had the opportunity to hear Ms. Dang answer briefly 
questions about her marital status, occupation and residence. 
R. 330. Though the State did not question Ms. Dang further when 
it had the chance, the prosecutor stated that he did not want to 
embarrass Ms. Dang by questioning her further. R. 368. 
The trial court noted that the State had not struck one 
person of obvious Indian descent from the panel. Lastly, the 
trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
prosecutor in assessing the genuineness of his responses. 
B. THOUGH BOWMAN IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE A PRIMA 
FACIE SHOWING OF DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE THE STATE 
DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE 
PROSECUTOR'S USE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ITS STRIKES TO 
REMOVE TWO OUT OF THREE OF THE MINORITY MEMBERS 
FROM THE PANEL ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 
DISCRIMINATION. 
x
. See Section II of the Statement of Facts for additional 
details. For a summary of jury selection, see Addendum I. 
16 
If the party exercising the peremptory strike does not 
challenge the sufficiency of his opponent's prima facie case at 
trial, and instead offers an explanation to rebut the claim of 
discrimination, the reviewing court will not address the issue of 
whether a prima facie case was established on appeal. 
Higglnbothgm, 917 P.2d at 547; State v. Macial. 854 p.2d 543, 545 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Once the proponent of the strike attempts to 
rebut the claim of discrimination, the question of whether a 
prima facie case was established is irrelevant. The reviewing 
court then proceeds to the next step to determine if a race 
neutral explanation was given, and if so, was it merely a pretext 
masking a discriminatory purpose. Id. 
In this case, the State did not challenge Bowman's claim 
that he had established a prima facie case of discrimination. 
R. 368. Instead, the prosecutor attempted to rebut the claim of 
discrimination by offering what he claimed was a race neutral 
explanation for the strikes. R. 368. 
Even though Bowman is not required to make a. prima facie 
showing of purposeful discrimination, there is none the less 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. in order to 
establish a prima facie case, the defendant must present 
sufficient evidence to support an inference of purposeful 
discrimination. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1721, 476 U.S. at 92. The 
trial court should consider all the relevant circumstances. A 
pattern of strikes against minority jurors, the prosecutor's 
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questions and statements during voir dire, and the fact that the 
exercise of peremptory strikes is subject to abuse are all 
factors the court should consider. Id. at 1722-23; 96-97. Utah 
Courts have provided further guidance in determining whether the 
opponent of the strike has established a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination: 
The elements necessary to such a prima facie case 
include (1) as complete a record as possible, (2) 
a showing that persons excluded belong to a 
cognizable group . . .and (3) a showing that 
there exists "a strong likelihood that such 
persons are being challenged because of their 
group association rather than because of any 
specific bias. 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). 
In this case, Bowman has met his burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of discrimination. The record is sufficiently 
complete for review. The prosecutor offered explanations for his 
strikes. Because the trial judge noted the presence of other 
minority members on the panel in his ruling, the racial makeup of 
the jury panel after "for cause" strikes were made by the court 
is known. R. 3 69. 
Both Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires are members of cognizable 
racial groups. Defense counsel noted for the record that 
Ms. Dang was a person of Asian descent, and that Mrs. Alires was 
of Hispanic descent. R. 367. 
Lastly, the fact that the State used its first two out of 
three strikes to remove two-thirds of the minorities from the 
panel establishes an inference of purposeful discrimination. 
A disproportionate number of strikes against minority members, 
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at 458. Noting that "trial courts should consider 
disproportionate impact as circumstantial evidence of invidious 
intent," this Court held that as a matter of law the defendant 
had established a prima facie case. JEc|. at 462. 
In this case, there were three minorities left on the 
panel after for cause strikes had been made, Mrs. Alires, 
Ms. Dang, and Mr. Nadkarni. T. 69-70. The State used three 
quarters of its strikes against minorities and was responsible 
for the removal of three quarters of the minorities from the 
panel. The prosecutor used his first two strikes to remove 
Ms. Dang and Mrs. Alires. He did not question either prospective 
juror when given an opportunity to do so.2 As in Pharris, the 
fact that the prosecutor used a disproportionate number of his 
strikes to remove minorities, struck most of the minorities from 
the panel, and did not individually question either Mrs. Alires 
or Ms. Dang establishes an inference of purposeful 
discrimination. 
C. THE PROSECUTOR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR STRIKING 
MRS. ALIRES FROM THE PANEL WAS A PRETEXT FOR 
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION. 
Elem held that any facially neutral explanation to a 
Batson challenge would suffice to rebut a prima facie showing of 
discrimination. However, the Court did not abdicate all 
meaningful review of the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's 
explanation. It is at the "third step that the persuasiveness of 
2
. The only minority the State didn't strike, Mr. Nadkarni, 
had ties with law enforcement. R. 369-70. 
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court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried 
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination." Elem, 115 
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Mrs. Alirep was --* simply unsupported by the record, it wa? 
d . : - 141 i * t\ I i i. es tr i catei. c 
questionnaire that n T;e or ner taxv.i .y members had been prosecuted 
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these factors will tend to show that the state's 
reasons are not actually supported by the record 
or are an impermissible pretext: (1) alleged 
group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in 
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or 
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the 
trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned 
the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special 
questioning designed to evoke a certain respon se, 
3
 Hiqginbotham was decided after Elem, yet tl I = Utal I Si ipr erne 
Court cited to its prior analysis in Cantu II. 
(4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the 
facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on 
reasons equally applicable to juror [sic] who 
were not challenged. 
Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (quoting State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 
18, 22 (Fla. 1988) . 
In this case, the State's reason for striking Mrs. Alires 
conflicted with the information the prosecutor had regarding her. 
If the prosecutor for some reason thought Mrs. Alires had lied 
about her relatives in her questionnaire, why didn't he ask her 
about it when he had the opportunity to do so? The prosecutor 
noted that some jurors had indicated on their questionnaires that 
they had family members who had been accused of crimes. He then 
asked the entire panel if any experience like that would affect 
their judgment. No one raised their hands.4 R. 341. The 
prosecutor could have followed up on that line of questioning 
with Mrs. Alires. He could easily have asked her again about her 
family ties without embarrassment or accusation if he was 
genuinely concerned that she was related to the person he had 
prosecuted. If through questioning he could establish that 
Mrs. Alires was related to this individual, and had 
misrepresented this information on the questionnaire, she would 
have likely been struck for cause.5 
4
. All of the prospective jurors who indicated they had 
family members who had been charged with crimes were struck for 
cause by the court. R. 69-70, 114. 
5
. If the prosecutor genuinely believed Mrs. Alires had lied 
on her questionnaire, he logically would have questioned her 
further to try and establish a for cause strike. Most trial 
attorneys will attempt to strike unwanted jurors for cause first, 
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The fact that Aiires JS =m Hispanic surname in no way implies 
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D^ BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR 
STRIKING MRS. ALIRES WAS CONTRARY T," THE ~ACTS, 
IT IS PRETEXTUAL AS A MATTER OF JAW 
*' * * h*- * ypical peremptory challenge inquiry, ".he 
de - . .1. - he t h e i: i.:o - ' '* -1 
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed," 
Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct, 1859, 1869, 500' U.S. 352, 365 
(1991) • -
whenever possit '.-r - -** lesetve H,S nuny | u' rern^ K *ry si LJIU'S UII 
they can. 
Brannen Smith and ¥vonne jacobsen both bHivtj ua the jury. 
Botn indicated on their questionnaires that they had no family 
members charged with a crime, R. 114. 
7
. The prosecutor claimed he did i lot know Mrs Aiires was a 
minority or that Aiires is an Hispanic surname. R. 368, 370, The 
trial court's ruling implies that the court accepted defense 
counsel's observation that Mrs. Aiires appeared to be of Hispanic 
descent and carried an Hispanic surname. If Mrs. Aiires was 
clearly not Hispanic, one can assume the trial court would have 
noted such an obvious and pertinent fact. R. 36 9, It is not 
unreasonable to assume that anyone who had dealt with the Hispanic 
community would be aware that Aiires was an Hispanic name. In 
fact, the prosecutor indicated he was in the process of charging an 
individual with the last name Aiires. Also, in Cantu, this very 
prosecutor helped supplement the jury panel in that case with 
persons randomly chosen from the master jury list because of their 
Hispanic surnames. Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 517. 
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the proponent of the strike. Because credibility is an issue of 
fact that often involves an assessment of the demeanor of the 
attorney exercising the strike, the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that absent "exceptional circumstances" the trial court's factual 
findings are entitled to great deference. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1870, 500 U.S. at 366. 
Utah Courts have favored a more refined approach to 
applying an appropriate standard of review.8 A review of 
Batson cases in this State reveal that while the courts often 
refer to the standard of review as "clearly erroneous," the issue 
of whether a prosecutor's justification is pretextual is treated 
as a mixed question of fact and law.9 
For example, the trial court's assessment of credibility 
is especially important when the proponent of the strike offers a 
subjective impression to justify the strike. See e.g. 
Hiqqinbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.10 In those instances the 
8
. Issues of standard of review are a matter of state law. 
Absent a direct federal mandate, Utah courts are not bound by 
federal standards of review. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268 
(Utah 1993) . 
9
. This approach is also judicially sound. While the trial 
court is in a unique position to determine factual disputes, "the 
appellate court addresses itself to the clarity and correctness of 
the developing law in order to provide unambiguous direction to 
those whose further rights and responsibilities are affected." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
10
. In Hiqqinbotham, the prosecutor justified her strike of 
a minority juror by stating that she felt the juror was looking at 
her in a hostile manner. 917 P. 2d at 546. The Utah Supreme Court 
applied a clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's 
assessment of the genuineness of the prosecutor's explanation for 
the strike, id. at 548. 
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11
. Elem does not change the result in Cantu, it merely 
focuses the court's review of the legitimacy of the strike in step 
three rather than step two. 
12
. Appellate judges "wltl I thei r collective experience and 
their broader perspective" are in a better position than the trial 
courts to define the law and provide "statewide standards that 
guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials." Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1272. 
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1769 at 1775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Elem does not require 
reviewing courts tolerate implausible explanations for strikes 
against minorities. Elem does not foreclose the situation where 
a reviewing court moves to step three of the analysis to 
determine that an implausible justification wholly unrelated to 
the case is pretextual as a matter of law. As Justice Stevens 
observed, "even this Court would acknowledge that some 
implausible, fantastic and silly explanations could be found to 
be pretextual without any further evidence." Id. 
In this case, the prosecutor's justification for striking 
Mrs. Alires was not based on a subjective impression of her 
fitness as a juror. He gave an objective reason which was not 
merely unsupported by a silent record, but was in direct 
contradiction to the facts known about the juror. The 
prosecutor's reason necessarily involved a belief that 
Mrs. Alires was lying. Such a belief is discriminatory itself. 
When a prosecutor's justification for striking a minority juror 
appears to be untrue based upon the juror's answers on voir dire, 
it should be rejected outright, just as the court would reject a 
justification like, "she was wearing a blue shirt." Bowman urges 
this Court to hold that under these narrow circumstances, the 
prosecutor's justification for striking Mrs. Alires was 
pretextual as a matter of law. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STRIKE 
AGAINST MRS. ALIRES WAS NOT A RESULT OF 
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
26 
The ultimate question in this case is whether the trial 
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This Court rejected the trial court's reasoning noting that 
13
. This case is distinguishable from Harrison. Unlike this 
case, in Harrison, the defendant did not establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination. Nor did he argue to the trial court the 
prosecutor's lack of meaningful voir dire. 
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"because a single challenge based on race is impermissible . . . 
neither fact is dispositive of the issue of discrimination in the 
removal of other jurors." 846 P.2d at 465 (quoting State v. 
Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1988). Similarly, in this case, 
the fact that the prosecutor did not strike the last remaining 
minority on the panel does not support the conclusion that his 
strike against Mrs. Alires was not racially motivated. 
As in Cantu II, the record in this case does not support 
the trial court's finding of no discriminatory purpose. In Cantu 
II, the court held "the prosecutor's desultory voir dire, 
uninvolved demeanor, and failure to pursue a studied or 
deliberate course of questioning regarding specific bias, 
together with his stated reasons that the challenge was made in 
anger are enough to fulfill the requirements of Batson." 778 
P.2d at 519. Similarly, in this case the prosecutor wholly 
failed to pursue any meaningful voir dire examination of 
Mrs. Alires. His stated reason was contrary to the information 
provided by Mrs. Alires. He had no reason to believe that she 
was related to the person he had prosecuted other than the fact 
that their last names were the same, and absolutely no objective 
reason to believe Mrs. Alires was a liar. If a prosecutor can 
justify striking a minority juror on grounds that directly 
conflict with the facts, then the protections of Batson are 
illusory. Prosecutors who are inclined to discriminate will be 
given a green flag to simply adopt rote facially neutral 
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r*=-sr-:=:es LO conceal invidious motives. Elem, 115 S. Ct. at 1773 
(Stevens, T dissenting). 
F. THE STATE'S STRIKE AGAINST MRS. ALIRES IN 
VIOLATION OF BATSON REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
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integrity of the legal system, a harmless eiror analysis is 
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constitutional error to w;.i *r: ::. • Supreme C- urt has refused to 
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" ' " "..ssdioi even one venireman is 
intolerable. Pharris, . T ,. - 2d at 4^^ Because the 
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G. THE PROSECUTOR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR STRIKING 
MS. DANG FROM THE PANEL WAS A PRETEXT FOR 
PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION. 
The prosecutor exercised his first strike against 
Ms. Dana. • woman c: Asian desce.\ b9-~'0. When challenged, 
t h e p . -t-:rr € I 
Judge, with respect to the--Ms. Dang, when I 
heard her speak, I WHS concerned about the 
language problem. LL had nothing to do with her 
race, she said she's been here six years, and 
when I listened, and I didn't want to embarrass 
her by probing into that, when 1 listened to her 
questions (sic), I thought,, I'm not so sure that 
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her command of the English language is what I 
would prefer; had nothing to do with her race. 
R. 47: 5-12. The prosecutor's justification is not supported by 
the record. Initially, the trial court asked all the jurors to 
state their name, where they lived, their employment, marital 
status and spouse's employment. R. 4. The transcript of 
Ms. Dang's responses is partially incomplete because Ms. Dang was 
soft spoken and the recording was of poor quality. R. 330. 
However, a review of the actual video tape of the 
proceedings and the written record show that Ms. Dang gave all 
the information requested by the trial judge in the order 
requested.14 She apparently had no trouble understanding the 
judge's compound question. She did not appear to falter, or 
speak in grammatically incorrect phrases. R. 330. Indeed, she 
seemed to have only a slight accent. The fact that she had a 
slight accent does not mean she had a poor command of the English 
language. 
In Cantu II, the court based its reversal in part on the 
fact that the prosecutor's voir dire of the stricken juror was 
"both desultory and insufficient to establish any specific bias 
on the part of the jurors." 778 P.2d at 519. Ms. Dang's answers 
were very brief. If the prosecutor were genuinely concerned 
14
. The proceedings in this case were recorded on video tape. 
Though written transcripts are prepared for the convenience of the 
parties and Court, the actual video tape remains the official 
record of the proceedings. For this reason, it is appropriate for 
Bowman to refer the Court to the actual video tape in assessing 
whether the prosecutor's justification for striking Ms. Dang was 
pretextual. 
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aboi it I Is Dang• s ] anguage skills, he couiu na v> 3sked her a few 
general questions in voir dire to assess her aLio-tv without 
embarrassment If further questioning revealed language 
p 1 o b 1 e m s , J:*ot h pa 1"t i 1" • n an<:i I" hn 11 i. „i I r n 11 r t \ • 'MM *" ^  
agreed to strike her for cause. Though he had the opportunity, 
the prosecutor chose not to question Ms. Dang. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STRIKE 
AGAINST MS. DANG WAS NOT A RESULT OF PURPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS REQUIRING 
REVERSAL OF BOWMAN'S CONVICTION. 
r£,j.ie recorcj shows thac Ms. ucu±y n&d lived j.i± odxt r^--
County six years, wa« employed, had four years college. 1 
chemistry major. r .- If - •>: cour- na : observed language 
p- * * ivis. ud . . ::. ; voir aire, one 
can safety ass/ - :L- :OU:: -, ^ .. , :'BV« ^^ .a:. •»" its ruling. 
More important.; . . • " ^  L.a-iJ na : -jrriecr. iveiy demonstrated 
p • * 5 - .• - 1 - - - • ••• 
cause -" i>~~ o .* .—" *:*- r-.,. -*:....:: apparent^y :e.!ied soieiy 
upon the fact that the prosecutor -r\, : rir.-r s1 rike \he last 
rr . ; : 
discrimination As ^xplameu in P^ i::: subseci.. .n B of this 
brief, the facr r.ha* •-- prosecutor used his ^zrike^ to remove 
c axic 
of 'irir? issue or -:isc : iminat ion against Ms Dang. Pnarris, •-•4c 
P.2d at 465. 
The prosecuL 01l , 11 J , I 1 J. 1 -Jat .1 c i \ I 1 -' 1 J k J 11 1 II1 I" 111 1 n 
a pretext for purposeful discrimination. Because the trial 
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court's ruling was clearly erroneous, Bowman's conviction should 
be reversed and remanded with orders that he be given a new 
trial. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT BOWMAN'S STATEMENTS 
ADMITTED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES ONLY COULD NOT 
BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE A 
LIMITING INSTRUCTION. 
In order to avoid a mid-trial suppression hearing on 
whether Bowman's admissions were given in violation of Miranda, 
the trial court allowed Bowman's admissions to remain in evidence 
since the prosecutor only used them for impeachment in his 
rebuttal. Since the trial court chose to avoid the Miranda issue 
raised by defense counsel and allow the statements in under 
Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 643, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Bowman 
was entitled to a limiting instruction informing the jury that 
the admissions could only be used for impeachment and not as 
evidence of guilt. 
In Harris, the United State's Supreme Court held that 
statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used for 
impeachment purposes to attack a defendant's testimony at trial. 
91 S. Ct. at 646, 401 U.S. at 226. See also, State v. Trover, 
910 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1995). Evidence taken in violation of 
Miranda is not admissible as substantive evidence in the 
prosecutor's case in chief. If statements taken in violation of 
Miranda are allowed under Harris, they are admissible solely for 
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impeachment purposes. Oregon v\ Hass, 9S &. ^ - ~- - 12?1 420 
U, S. 714, 722-23 (1975); Michigan v. Harvey, i 
1180, 4L-- - 344, 351 (1 990) . 
: l Bar i is and Ha a 
jury that the defendant's staiemeii:.& offeree ^/ t„- pi^se^u^on 
could not be used as proof ^f QUI i - r.-; .-;•• . :: on.' \ oe considered 
in assessing the • defer . Han -^. z 
644 , 4 01 U.S. at 2 2 3 ;
 ;Hasi , * r. - ar 17 - ? , 4 2 ;.• , ,:. 
A limiting instruction li'^ ie *-har g: ven - ^  Harris -• Hass should 
be given when requested, minted States .Metrein, , 
14, - • • . L?95) . 
issue of whether the trial court must cive a 
limiting . . ^ i , ,, •.,,,;1 "pon request when admitting evidence 
defendant : statements under Harris has no: been considered 
c:v'<- ._ t^ :..^  ^ ^ /, ±±±JJ vutah Ct. App. 
1988) , i.n~ defendant: argued tnaL the t:;^a] court erred by not 
givina a limiting ir =51 ruction when his statements taken in 
\ i o 1 d l' i i:»11 i * I M i r a n d a w e i : e a i'.1 n111 t (•»d 1- c i ? i n i p P . * c h m e T I I | i. ?" j"»oCJ!e i '"I'"'11e 
court held chat because the defendant failed to object to the 
lack of instruction at trial, he was precluded from raising the 
i ssue : i i a± r-^c, , , 
In State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1989) the 
court held that ' -. "•" ^anifes" -rroi : v the *• v"ial iudge :,o 
Id 
use of statements admitted under Harris. The court based its 
holding in large par t on the fact that the defendant did not 
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request an instruction, and the evidence was used only in 
rebuttal to impeach the defendant's testimony. Id. 
Both Gardner and Ayala support the proposition that had 
the defendant requested a limiting instruction, the trial court 
would be obligated to give it. A trial court has a duty to 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case. 
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 58 (Utah 1981). Additionally, Rule 
105, Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party 
or for one purpose but not admissible as to 
another party or for another purpose is admitted, 
the court, upon request, shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly. 
The term "shall" is generally presumed mandatory rather than 
discretionary. Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
For example, State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 
1985) held that the trial court erred in refusing to grant 
counsel's request for an instruction cautioning the jury that 
evidence of the defendant's juvenile conviction could be 
considered only in connection with the issue of identity. In 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977) the court held 
that it was error to fail to give a limiting instruction as to 
the proper use of a non testifying co-defendant's statements at 
trial. And State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) 
held that the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction 
upon request that admission of evidence of other crimes may be 
considered only for the limited purpose for which it is 
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sr;p- -: r offered. See also State v. Wellard, '; ^  ^ 2d :*14# 
917 vucah li?5c^ 'where evia^^c ,.s admissib"! . .. . _^  ef 
but inadmissible ZDT another, the jury k'p^ - : be instructed not 
t' : ) 
Iii v.aib Lddt Bowman' .,;. . id request a 1 .ii'.ina 
instructio: ; Because the tri al court ruled that 
t .'_•-- - a s :i n: ipeachmei it evi den ::e w:i t l 1 :>i it 
rt::;i on Bowman's Miranda claim, t.he court was obligated to give 
the -">-v p ^'•—- n ] i m-•" :• ng the use of Bowman's statements. 
R ... gi ai it Bowmai 1' s i: eguest was 
prejudicial error. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE A LIMITING 
INSTRUCTION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE IT 
ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT BOWMAN WITHOUT 
WEIGHING THE STRENGTH OF THE STATE'S EYE WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. 
The State1' s case against Bowman hinged c i 1 Deputy < "a \ < )< n i i 5 
identification of the driver of the motorcycle. Cardon testified 
t -e "" ' *r driver's 
face twice 101 a - 5..-::
 h.\-i ^  • - ^me. R "he saw the 
oriver the first r ir^ as he drove past ner ** ::.~ iitersection. 
i .- ..- -
 : L • - • ' " :ir ")und witn a car 
ahead <r riei w^; .-- .- t.A::. :':..•/. . . tcrcy^le went through 
th° - r e r s e c t i ^ r at- i:,out . ' v.; 25 miles pe nour and was about 
1 . ,. • - . i to 
see his face i ,1 a : ew seconas -^ ----- bt-cia time Cardon 
saw the driver's face, he was approaching :_~r vehicle • :i 69. 
She testified on direct that she saw the driver's face for 
approximately 5 seconds. R. 148. It was approximately 11:40 at 
night when the chase took place. Cardon was approaching the end 
of her shift and had been working since 2:00 p.m. R. 159. She 
stated that during the chase her "adrenaline was pumping." 
R. 168. 
Cardon testified that her initial description of the 
motorcycle broadcast over the radio to dispatch did not include 
the make or model of the motorcycle. She did not provide a 
detailed description of the bike. The only details Cardon was 
able to give to dispatch to described the bike was that it was 
mid-size and brown. R. 160. She could not tell whether the 
motorcycle had a license plate. R. 161. Bowman's motorcycle was 
a two tone brown, 1000 cc Honda. R. 208. It was a big touring 
bike with large chrome exhaust pipes, and had a clear and silver 
Veter Ghost faring. R. 217. The Honda insignia was displayed on 
the bike. R. 173. 
Cardon testified that she observed the driver's clothing 
and told dispatch the driver was wearing shorts and a tank top. 
However, other deputies, based on her description of the driver 
to dispatch, pulled over another man on a motorcycle wearing long 
pants and a long sleeved shirt shortly after the chase. R. 161-
162. 
Bowman's statement to the deputies that he ran because 
he was angry with his ex-wife was offered by the prosecutor and 
admitted by the trial court for impeachment purposes because of 
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potential Miranda problems. R. 136. The critical issue at trial 
was the reliability of Cardon's eye witness identification of the 
driver. Used substantively, Bowman's statement amounted to a 
tacit admission that he was the driver. Without an instruction 
limiting the use of the statements to impeachment, the jury could 
simply rely on the admission as substantive proof that Bowman was 
indeed the driver. By allowing the State to argue the evidence 
substantively, the jury did not have to consider the reliability 
of Cardon's identification.15 If the jury had been properly 
instructed that the evidence was only to be used for impeachment 
purposes, the jury could have found Bowman's credibility lacking, 
but still have decided that the State had not met its burden of 
proof because the eye witness identification was unreliable. 
Bowman was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to properly 
instruct the jury because the trial court's ruling allowed the 
jury to avoid having to weigh the eye witness identification 
evidence against the State's burden of proving its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. For that reason, the trial court's error was 
not harmless and Bowman's conviction should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
POINT III. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT 
WHEN HE STATED DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT 
BOWMAN COULD HAVE SUBPOENAED A KEY STATE'S 
WITNESS HIMSELF. 
15
. Despite the fact that the statements were admitted for 
impeachment purposes only, the prosecutor argued the evidence 
substantively in closing argument. R. 283. 
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The prosecutor's statement that the defendant could have 
subpoenaed Mitchell, the witness who initially told the police 
that Bowman was the driver of the motorcycle, was improper and 
prejudicial. It is generally improper to comment on a 
defendant's failure to call a witness. Whitney v. State, 915 
P.2d 881 (Nevada 1996). However, under some narrow circumstances 
the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to call a 
witness. Under the "missing witness inference" a prosecutor may 
call attention to the defendant's failure to call a witness if 
the witness is peculiarly within the control of the defendant and 
could reasonably be expected to give favorable testimony in 
support of the defendant's theory of his defense. Graves v. 
United States. 14 S. Ct. 40, 41, 150 U.S. 118 (1893); State v. 
Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985), Gilbert v. State, 891 
P.2d 228, 230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). When the missing witness 
could logically be expected to materially support the defense, 
and is essentially available only to the defendant, the inference 
can fairly be drawn that the witness's testimony would not have 
been favorable to the defendant and that is why the witness was 
not called. 
Some courts have adopted a looser approach and no longer 
require a showing that the witness was peculiarly within the 
control of the defendant. These courts allow the negative 
inference whenever the witness's testimony would naturally be 
expected to be favorable to the defense. Gilbert, 891 P.2d at 
230. Utah has favored the more traditional approach and does not 
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allow comment on a missing witness if the witness was available 
to both parties. Smith, 706 P.2d at 1057. A witness is 
peculiarly within the power of a defendant to produce if the 
witness is physically available only to the defendant, or has the 
type of relationship with the defendant that "pragmatically 
renders his testimony unavailable" to the State. Id. 
In State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 49-50 (Utah 1989), the 
court held that the prosecutor improperly commented on the 
defendant's failure to call a witness because the witness was 
equally accessible to both parties and her testimony was not 
material to the defense. Similarly, the prosecutor's comment in 
this case fails to meet the criteria necessary to support a 
negative missing witness inference. The missing witness was 
available to the State. Mitchell gave the police his home 
address. R. 173. Mitchell was a prosecution witness, not a 
defense witness, and was listed as a State's witness in the 
police reports. R. 281. Mitchell could not logically be 
expected to provide testimony favorable to the defendant. This 
witness approached police officers, told them that he had 
witnessed the chase, knew the driver, and the driver was Bowman. 
Also, Bowman testified that Mitchell held a grudge against him 
for throwing him out of the apartment. R. 221-22. 
The prosecutor's improper comment had the effect of 
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. When the 
prosecutor was faced with Bowman's contention that because it had 
failed to call a material eye witness it had not proved its case 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor responded by trying to 
shift the burden of proof back to the defendant to explain the 
absence of the witness. R. 272-73; 281. Since the prosecutor's 
comment did not fall within the scope of the missing witness 
inference, the only inference left for the jury to make was that 
it was Bowman's responsibility to prove his innocence by calling 
the witness himself. 
This case is nearly identical to Whitney. In Whitney, 
the defendant pointed out in closing argument that the prosecutor 
had failed to call material witnesses. 915 P.2d at 882. The 
State responded by arguing that the defendant should have called 
the witnesses himself. Ld. The Nevada Supreme Court held: 
It is generally also outside the boundaries of 
proper argument to comment on a defendant's 
failure to call a witness. This can be viewed as 
impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the 
defense. Such shifting is improper because 'it 
suggests to the jury that it was the defendant's 
burden to produce proof by explaining the absence 
of witnesses or evidence. This implication is 
clearly inaccurate.' 
Id. (citations omitted). See also, Ross v. State, 803 P.2d 1104 
(Nev. 1990) (prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to call 
a witness improperly shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant.)16 
16
. This case is distinguishable from Smith. In Smith, the 
defendant improperly commented on the State's failure to call 
witnesses. The trial court instructed the jury to ignore counsel's 
remarks because the witnesses were available to the defense and 
were not witnesses to the crime charged. The court held that the 
trial judge's statements regarding why the missing witness 
inference was inappropriate did not shift the burden of proof. In 
this case, the prosecutor improperly argued the missing witness 
inference. 
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The prosecutor prefaced his remarks by stating that 
the defendant had no responsibility to produce evidence. R. 281. 
However, after making this disclaimer, the prosecutor immediately 
asked the jury to infer that it was the defendant's 
responsibility to produce the missing witness. R. 281. The 
prosecutor's disclaimer does not render his improper argument 
harmless. Indeed it demonstrates that the prosecutor knew that 
his comment amounted to an improper shifting of the burden of 
proof and nevertheless intentionally made the improper argument. 
In Clum v. State, 893 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1995) the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's 
failure to call a witness, and prefaced his comments with a 
similar disclaimer. The court in Clum noted, "Thus, the 
prosecutor asked the jury to draw the very inference that he 
disavowed . . . When the prosecutor's disclaimer is evaluated in 
light of the argument that followed, it proves as misleading as 
Marc Antony's protestation that he had come to bury Caesar, not 
to praise him." Xd. Similarly, in this case the prosecutor's 
prefatory disclaimer was merely a disingenuous rhetorical device 
that does not in any way ameliorate the harmful effect of his 
subsequent argument. 
The harm was further exacerbated by the prosecutor's 
comment that Bowman had the same right to subpoena witnesses to 
trial as the State. R. 281. It is not proper for the State to 
comment on the defendant's opportunity to subpoena witnesses. 
State v. Johnson, 760 P.2d 760, 762 (Mont. 1988); Bland v. State, 
41 
803 P.2d 856, 862 (Alaska 1990). "The State has the burden of 
proof, and whether or not the defense subpoenaed a witness is 
irrelevant." Bland, 803 P.2d at 862. 
In determining whether the jury was influenced by a 
prosecutor's improper remarks, the court will examine the 
evidence of the defendant's guilt. In a case where "the 
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, 
there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly 
influenced through remarks of counsel." State v. Span, 819 P.2d 
329, 334 (Utah 1991). In such cases there is a greater chance 
that the jury's verdict was influenced by counsel's improper 
argument. .Id. 
When a prosecutor improperly argues the missing witness 
inference, the effect is to encourage speculation, to shift the 
burden of proof, and to ask the jury to draw a negative inference 
against the defendant which is not supported by the evidence. 
The practical effect of the improper argument is to unfairly 
undermine the defense theory. Additionally, jurors tend to have 
confidence in the prosecutor's office to pursue justice fairly 
and in good faith. A prosecutor's insinuations and assertions 
are apt to carry a great deal of weight with a jury when in fact 
they should carry not weight at all. Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935). For these reasons 
reversal is often warranted when a prosecutor improperly comments 
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on the defendant's failure to call a witness.17 
In this case, the prosecutor called the juror's attention 
to inappropriate material. It was unfair for the prosecutor to 
faijl to call a material eye witness to the chase, and then ask 
the jury to draw a negative inference against Bowman because he 
did not call the witness. The negative inference the prosecutor 
asked the jury to draw from the defendant's failure to call the 
State's witness was not fairly supported by the evidence. The 
prosecutor's argument encouraged the jury to speculate on matters 
not in evidence and tended to shift their focus away from the 
weakness of the State's eye witness identification evidence. 
This case is distinguishable from Thompson. In Thompson, 
the prosecutor made one improper remark about the failure of the 
defendant to call a minor witness. The witness presumably would 
have helped establish the defendant's claim that the victim had 
an opportunity to seek help during the alleged kidnapping, but 
did not do so. The court found no prejudice for several reasons. 
0n£, the defendant ignored the prosecutor's remark and did not 
seek a remedy. Two, the missing witness was not a material 
witness. Therefore, the defense's theory was not seriously 
prejudiced by the negative inference, because the defendant had 
other opportunities throughout the trial to make the same point 
17
. See e.g. Whitney v. State, 915 P.2d 881 (Nev. 1996) ; Ross 
v. State, 803 P.2d 1104 (Nev. 1990); Gilbert v. State, 891 P.2d 228 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Clum v. State, 893 P.2d 1277 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. Suarez, 670 P.2d 1192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); 
United States v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1971); Graves v. 
United States, 14 S.Ct. 40, 150 U.S. 118 (1893). 
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the missing witness would have made had she testified. Three, 
the slight prejudice of one passing remark was offset by jury 
instructions that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty, 
and statements of counsel are not evidence. 
In this case, the outcome of the trial turned on the 
jury's assessment of the strength of Deputy Cardon's 
identification. Mitchell was the major eye witness to the crime. 
Since he knew Bowman and saw the chase, his testimony was 
critical. The defense theorized that because Mitchell bore a 
grudge against Bowman, he had misinformed the police. This 
erroneous information tainted Deputy Cardon's subsequent 
identification. Unlike Thompson, a determination of this issue 
was critical to the verdict. When viewed in conjunction with 
the trial court's error in allowing the jury to improperly use 
Bowman's statements substantively, the cumulative error was too 
prejudicial for the jury instructions to offset. 
The combination of the court's refusal to give a limiting 
instruction and the prosecutor's misconduct deprived Bowman of 
fair trial. The total effect was to divert the jury's attention 
from the critical task of evaluating the weakness of the State's 
eye witness identification evidence. Therefore, Bowman's 
conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court reverse his convictions on both counts and 
remand the case to the trial court with orders for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this Hit day of November, 1996. 
trffa 7kC\&C.i*£*J 
-fbry- REBECCA C . HYD:
 V 
P Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
'\W A Zjft. 
ROBIN K. /tfOUNGBERG 
Attorney fox Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM I 
SUMMARY OF JURY SELECTION 
JURORS STRUCK FOR CAUSE: 
1. Laurie Packard: She stated she had commitments out of 
town for the next ten days. R. 325-26. She had ties to law 
enforcement, but stated that she could objectively evaluate a 
police officer's testimony; would be influenced by an 
experience with a dishonest police officer. R. 351. 
2. Judy Cash: Felt that the defendant must have been doing 
something wrong or he would not have been charged. R. 34 9. 
3. Richard Acey: Expressed opinion that defendant is 
probably guilty because he was charged. R. 350. 
4. Victor Coloroso: Has friends in law enforcement; is an 
ex-police officer; tends to put a great deal of trust in 
police officers; would believe the testimony of a police 
officer over a citizen. R. 355. 
5. Anita Pedersen: Husband is a police officer; would not 
automatically believe testimony of a police officer. R. 334, 
344. 
6. George Maxwell: Friend of defense counsel. R. 33 6. 
PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN ORDER THAT TAKEN: 
1. My Dang 
2. Frances Alires 
3. Susan Lawrence 
DEFENDANT'S PEREMPTORY STRIKES IN ORDER THAT TAKEN: 
1. Melvin Sadler 
2. Nancy Bowles-Reading 
3. Sudhir Nadkarni 
JURORS 
1. Brannen Smith 
2. Donald Roden 
3. Douglas Coleby 
4. Edward Mika 
5. Shirley Parman 
6. Monte Ring 
7. Yvonne Jacobsen 
8. Dean Selack 
ADDENDUM I I 
JURY QUESTIONNAIRE - CRIMINAL CASE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - JUDGE THORNE 
NAME y^ntP X flQjrcX-, 
CITY/COMMUNITY A • ^ C , YRS IN SL COUNTYJ&. 
EDUCATION YRS COMPLETED /.") HS DIPLOMA? YES / NO LOCATION 
COLLEGE DEGREE {) (} MAJOR SCHOOL 
OCCUPATION T / ^ ^€r4n V EMPLOYER Jfr^^Ql" OaC^ . KW. 
MARITAL STATUS ^ s NUMBER OF CHILDREN •? AGES ?? - ?g~ J*-) 
PREVIOUS SERVICE AS A JUROR? YES llSd WHERE? WHEN? 
ARE YOU RELATED TO OR CLOSE FRIENDS WITH A LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICIAL? YES <NO) 
NAME AND AGENCY 
NAME AND AGENCY 
HAVE YOU / A CLOSE FRIENjPiFAMILY MEMBER EVER BEEN THE VICTIM OF A 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE? YES J^g) 
WHAT CRIME? 
YEAR? WHERE2 
WHAT CRIME? 
YEAR? WHERE! 
HAVE YOU / FAMILY MEMBER BEEN CHARGED WITH AN OFFENSE? YES {NQ. 
IF SO, WHAT? YEAR? WHERE? 
JJFSO.WHAT? YEAR? WHERE? 
IS THERE A REASON YOU WOULD BE UNABLE TO SERVE ON A JURY TODAY? 
•i/zL 
I hereby swear that the above information is true - •••'/•> •*'. * ,\--> / • / / > n ^— 
Date / - /<?-<?A 
ADDENDUM III 
• out of the courtroom and the door is--
2
 MR. YOUNGBERG: Do you want me to get 
3 that door, Judge? 
4
 THE COURT: Yeah, please. Your bailiff 
5 days are coming back to help us. And the door to the 
® hallway is closed now. 
M Mr. Youngberg, you wanted the benefit of the 
8 record? 
9
 I MR. YOUNGBERG: Yes, Judge. At this 
point, I'd like to raise a Batsun challenge to the 
prosecution's first two preemptory strike. 
His strike No. 1 was of Juror No. 9, My Dang, a 
young woman of obviously Asian descent. I'd note for the 
record that on her questionnaire, there did not appear to be 
any problems as far as her not being able to serve as a 
juror. 
17 I Likewise, on Juror No. 16, which was prosecutor 
challenge No. 2, Prances Alires, another woman of--of 
1 9
 Hispanic descent; again, nothing in her questionnaire 
20 indicates that she's unable to serve as a juror, positive or 
21 negative. 
22 xfd also like to point out for the record, Judge, 
23 that the prosecutor did not question those two individuals 
24 individually when he had the opportunity, and I—I do not 
25 [ have any notes of any questions being directed to those two 
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jurors; but I think that that shows a prima facie Batsun 
challenge, anyway, and it requires the prosecutor to give an 
explanation for the striking of them. 
THE COURT: Mr. Walsh? 
MR. WALSH: Judge, with respect to the--
Ms. Dang, when I heard her speak, I — I was concerned about 
the language problem. It had nothing to do with her race, 
I—she said she's been here six years, and I—when I 
listened, and I didn't want to embarrass her by probing into 
that, when I listened to her questions (sic), I thought, I'm 
not so sure that her command of the English language is what 
I would prefer; had nothing to do with her race. 
With respect to Ms. Alires, I don't know whether 
she's a minority or not. I have another defendant by the 
name of, I think Connie Fran—not Frances Alires, and in 
that case, relatives of my defendant received a lot of 
property from this woman who worked in an optician shop-
when I say a lot of property, she got free glasses, and I 
didn't—and I didn't probe in there, but I thought there may 
be some connection there with an other criminal defendant 
that I have; consequently, I struck her. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: If I could respond to 
the second one, Judge, on the questionnaire, there was a 
specific question about, have you or a close friend or a 
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family member ever been the victim of a crime? No, she 
circled no. 
Have any—have you or family member been charged 
with an offense? She circled no. 
I would argue that this is simply based on her 
Hispanic surname and I--I would like Mr. Walsh to let me 
know how many Smiths, Jonses, Cashes, Colebys, Maxwells he 
also deals with criminal cases on. 
And I think this is clearly based on race, Judge, 
at least Hispanic surname cases. 
THE COURT: Ifm going to deny the 
challenge. I think the case law makes fairly clear that the 
challenge at least has to pose race-neutral basis. It does 
not--if I remember part of the words of the Court, it 
doesn't have to be a good reason, it simply has to be a 
neutral reason. 
I will note for the record as well that there is a 
person of obvious Indian descent who did remain and was not 
stricken. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Well, he was stricken by 
me, Judge, because he had a contract with the county to 
provide sur—surveillance equipment to the prison. I should 
also note for the record that that individual was on my jury 
panel two days ago and he was actually stricken for cause 
because he indicated that he has a contractual relationship 
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with law enforcement and would be uncomfortable serving as a 
juror, so that was—that was my reason for that. 
THE COURT: Okay, Anything else that 
either of you gentlemen want to put on the record? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: No, Judge. 
MR. WALSH: Judge, and let me just--I 
don't even know that Alires is a—a minority name. I mean, 
I—I think Mr. Youngberg here is grasping at straws. 
As I say, I have another defendant, it's the same 
name and it's an unusual name, that's why I can remember 
that; I can't remember all the Smiths I have, but I've only, 
in my 15 years, only had one Alires, and so I do remember 
that, it's an ongoing case, still pending out in Murray, so 
I'm well aware of that case, so... 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. We'll be in 
recess then, plan on starting as soon as the jurors are 
ready. 
Counsel, do you—how long do you expect to take 
for openings? 
MR. WALSH: At most ten minutes, Judge. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Five--five to seven 
minutes probably, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. And then do you want 
to take the first witness before lunch or do you want to 
wait?* That's—or we can give the option to the jurors. 
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ADDENDUM IV 
1 MR. WALSH: May the other deputies be 
2 I excused, Judge? 
3 THE COURT: Anything--that's right. 
4 We'll excuse the witnesses. 
5 Anything else that needs to be placed on the 
6 record? 
7 MR. YOUNGBERG: Judge, I--I probably 
8 should just put this on the record, before you leave, Dave. 
9 MR. WALSH: Lenny, you can leave if you 
10 want. Yes. 
11 MR. YOUNGBERG: I did get a copy of the 
12 follow-up report today from the officer. That's the report 
13 in which this apparent questioning is mentioned, that the 
14 prosecutor got evidence of. 
15 It appears that the questioning was done without 
16 Miranda rights, and so I would move that there be a--an 
17 instruction given to the jury that they should not consider 
18 that evidence. And I apologize for not bringing this up, 
19 you know, six months ago; but as I said, this is the first 
20 day we've seen this officer's report. 
21 It appears to be a violation of his--of his 
22 Constitutional rights, Judge, in that he was not given his 
23 Miranda rights prior to the questioning and so I'd ask for a 
24 curative instruction. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Walsh? 
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1 \ MR. WALSH: Judge, most of what is 
2 contained in that report, except what Deputy Bruno testified 
3 to, did not come out until rebuttal evidence, when the 
4 officer, Officer Bruno testi--or I mean Deputy Cardon; but 
5 the portion about the wife and the kids being in Canada, 
6 that was initially brought up when he testified, and then in 
7 response to that, I questioned him about it and then asked 
8 the officers to come in and impeach him. And for purposes 
9 of impeachment, whether there's Miranda or not, those 
10 statements are admissible. 
Furthermore, Judge, I don't think there's—as the-
-as everybody's testified, this was not in response to any 
interrogation. Mr. Bowman was just ranting and raving and 
14 I repeating himself over and over and over again. 
15 THE COURT: Clearly, what Officer Cardon 
16 testified to was rambling; but Officer Bruno seemed to 
17 indicate that this may—very well may have been as a result 
18 of questioning after the arrest. 
19 MR. WALSH: And that's what I say. It's 
20 significant, Judge, that after he's testified, if there is 
2i no Miranda, if there—even assume there is no Miranda, and a 
22 violation of the Miranda rights, the Court has said that 
23 doesn't give him the right to take the stand and lie, and so 
if there—if it's used for impeachment, and that's why I 
left it until the end, if it's used for impeachment, then 
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1 I it's appropriate, whether there's Miranda or not. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. YOUNGBERG: And just for the record, 
4 Judge, the officer's report does state, and I quote, "Mr. 
5 Bowman was asked why he ran. Mr. Bowman said that his wife 
6 won't let him see his kids, that she lives in Toronto." 
7 Once again, Mr. Bowman was asked why he ran, and 
8 he stated that he was just acting out a life and that he was 
9 a wild man. 
10 So, it does appear to be an interrogation. If 
11 that's what the prosecutor is offering it for, then we need 
12 an instruction in that—for that, saying that it's 
13 impeachment evidence only and it's not substantive evidence. 
14 MR. WALSH: Well, and I beg to differ, 
15 Judge. If it's impeachment evidence, it can b e — i t ' s 
16 substantive evidence, and therefore, it comes in as 
17 substantive evidence of what he said at that time. You 
18 know, and that's why I left it to the end, I didn't bring it 
19 out on direct examination, the story about the kids and 
20 whatever, in Canada. 
21 So, as I say, I mean, once he's taken the stand, 
22 whether there's a violation or not, he's not entitled to 
23 take the stand and lie. And so that's why the Supreme Court 
24 has held that if there's a violation of Miranda, if he 
25 testifies, then a l l — t h e n he's fair game as to what he said. 
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THE COURT: 
the point that you're making. 
curative instruct 
of reasons why. 
One, I 
makes that admiss 
attention of the 
case that the twc 
really a question 
or not. 
And it1 
Mr. Youngberg, I understand 
I'm not going to give the 
ion. Let me state 
think Mr. Walsh is 
•ible; but two. 
for the record a couple 
correct that the law 
, I think that would draw the 
jury to the question, when I think that the 
> of you have ] Laid < Dut for the jury is 
[ of whether the officer did see the person 
s for those two reasons; first, I don't 
believe it's critical that they be : 
second, that it was admissible 
Okay. 
the record? 
it, gentlemen, or 
then. 
Gene, I 
instructions, if 
Anything else 
as i1 
that 
MR. YOUNGBERG: 
MR. WALSH: 
THE COURT: 
No, 
Are 
instructed on that, and 
t was presented. 
needs to be placed on 
No, Judge. 
sir. 
you ready to argue about 
• do you need a moment? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: 
MR. WALSH: 
THE COURT: 
'd ask you to 
you would, pl< 
Don 
Yeah. 
't need any time, Judge. 
Okay. Let's bring them back 
hand 
*ase, 
out the jury 
sir. 
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